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This article discusses the likely Supreme Court invalidation of the disparate-impact 
test as a means for proving a violation of the Fair Housing Act. It analyzes the 
arguments of the competing sides in support of and opposed to continued use of the 
disparate-impact test, in particular the arguments of fair housing advocates, HUD, 
and the banking and insurance industries. It concludes that the disparate-impact test 
remains an important tool in the continued fight against unfair and unequal housing 
policies.
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S
hortly after Hurricane Katrina destroyed 
much of its multifamily housing stock, St. 
Bernard Parish, a predominantly white 
community bordering New Orleans, issued an 
ordinance restricting the rental of single-family 
residences to blood relatives of the property 
owners.1  The city claimed the ordinance would 
preserve the character of the community—a 
community where 93% of homeowners are white.2  
It did not expressly mention race; however, its 
effect was to severely limit the number of rental 
units available to minorities. To all local observers, 
its discriminatory intent was clear. Under current 
federal law, the ordinance is a violation of the Fair 
Housing Act—an example of so-called disparate 
impact, where minorities fare worse than similarly 
situated whites without a legitimate justification. 
Without disparate impact, however, the law would 
likely stand in the absence of any evidence of 
intent to discriminate.
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), enacted in 1968, 
prohibits discrimination in housing. An early 
issue for courts was whether the FHA prohibits 
laws, regulations, policies, or actions, like the 
blood relative law described above, that appear 
racially non-discriminatory but nonetheless limit 
the availability of housing for minority groups. 
The Seventh Circuit, in the 1975 case Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation v. Village of 
Arlington Heights,3 determined that the FHA 
indeed permitted plaintiffs to bring disparate 
impact claims. Since then, ten other circuit courts 
have agreed with the Seventh Circuit, upholding 
the applicability of disparate impact in the fair 
housing context.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court 
has agreed to hear three cases questioning the 
collective judgment of the circuit courts on the 
applicability of disparate impact under the FHA.4  
Two of the cases settled before the Supreme Court 
could adjudicate them. The Court heard the third 
case—Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs5 
—on January 21, 2015. Legal observers predict 
that the court will invalidate continued use of the 
disparate impact test in the fair housing context, 
likely ruling that Congress never intended to 
permit the use of the disparate impact test in the 
FHA context.6  
This paper will review that case and argue against 
the court’s expected conclusion. Specifically, 
it will argue that the drafters of Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act (the Fair Housing Act) did intend 
to permit disparate-impact litigation, and in the 
event of any ambiguity, the court should defer 
to the interpretation of the agency tasked with 
enforcing Title VIII—the agency for Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD)—which has repeatedly 
endorsed the disparate-impact test. The first part 
will provide background on the disparate-impact 
test and the opinions of its proponents—fair 
housing advocates—and its detractors—large 
financial institutions, state housing agencies, and 
insurers. The second part will review the legal 
dispute over the disparate-impact test and argue 
in favor of affirming its application to fair housing 
cases.
An early issue for courts was 
whether the FHA prohibits 
laws, regulations, policies, or 
actions that appear racially non-
discriminatory but nonetheless 
limit the availability of housing 
for minority groups.
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P a r t  I :  W h at  i s  t h e  D i s p a r at e -
I m p a c t  T e s t  a n d  W h y  D o e s  i t 
M at t e r ?
Signed into law only a few days after the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known 
as the Fair Housing Act (FHA), provided much-
needed updates to laws prohibiting housing 
discrimination.7  The text of the FHA begins boldly: 
“It is the policy of the United States to provide, 
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.”8  It was an historic 
statement for a country that until then had 
largely sanctioned and even sponsored housing 
discrimination. 
Specifically, the FHA makes it unlawful to “make 
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, 
or national origin.”9  Additionally, section 3605(a) 
provides that it is unlawful “for any person or 
other entity whose business includes engaging 
in residential real estate-related transactions 
to discriminate against any person in making 
available such a transaction, or in the terms or 
conditions of such a transaction, because of race 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin.”10  An early question for courts, however, 
was whether the language of the FHA permitted 
disparate impact claims.
W h at  i s  t h e  d i s p a r at e - i m p a c t  t e s t ?
Disparate impact discrimination does not require 
intent to harm. It requires that a facially-neutral 
policy or practice create a situation where 
“minorities fare worse than similarly situated 
Whites.”11  For example, it includes a lender 
who refused to even consider applications for 
mortgages of less than $100,000 and thereby 
excluded a significant portion of the low-income 
minority market.12  To avoid liability under the 
FHA, the lender would need to show that the policy 
originates out of business necessity and that 
another policy that has a less discriminatory effect 
could not achieve the same goal.13  In the above 
example, the lender would likely be in violation of 
the Fair Housing Act, unless she could show that 
her business would lose money on any mortgage 
issued for less than $100,000. 
While eleven circuit courts have endorsed the use 
of the disparate-impact test, they have disagreed 
over the legal standards to apply to the test.14  In 
2013, a few days after the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear Magner v. Gallagher—the second of the 
three FHA disparate impact cases—HUD issued a 
rule that clarified the burden-shifting test, which 
the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted in Inclusive 
Communities.15  That test has three parts:
(1) Plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination by showing that a challenged 
practice causes a discriminatory effect;
(2) If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the 
defendant must then prove ‘that the challenged 
practice is necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests;’
(3) If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff 
must then show that the defendant’s interests 
‘could be served by another practice that has a less 
discriminatory effect.’16
In a recent case, D.C. Circuit Judge Richard Leon 
suggested that HUD published this rule not only to 
provide clarity to federal courts applying the FHA, 
Disparate-impact discrimination 
does not require intent to harm. 
It requires that a facially-neutral 
policy or practice create a 
situation where “minorities fare 
worse than similarly situated 
Whites.”
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but also to prevent invalidation of the disparate-
impact test.17  In essence, proponents of this theory 
argue that HUD created and published the rule 
with the hope that the Supreme Court would grant 
deference to it based on a decades-long string of 
cases concerning the level of deference afforded 
executive branch agencies.18  This theory seems 
far-fetched despite the suspicious timing.  First, 
followers of HUD policy are quick to point out that 
HUD policy has been consistent for over twenty 
years of formal adjudications since the passage 
of amendments to the FHA in 1988 expanding 
HUD’s role in enforcing the FHA; thus, its position 
on disparate impact is already clear.19  But more 
importantly, as the Solicitor General argued in 
Inclusive Communities, no federal agency creates 
and publishes a rule in less than nine days.
A R G U I N G  T H E  C A S E  F O R  D I S P A R A T E -
I M P A C T
Fair housing advocates argue that the disparate-
impact test is necessary to counteract the long 
history of housing discrimination and to stop 
the status quo from self-perpetuating.20  This 
most certainly was the congressional purpose 
behind the FHA. Moreover, fair housing advocates 
are concerned about the invalidation of the 
disparate-impact test because the leftover source 
of legal liability under the FHA—intentional 
discrimination—is difficult to prove.21  Advocates 
also say that opponents of the test overinflate 
its usage and concentrate unfairly on the most 
unusual cases.22  Finally, they charge that the test 
maintains its relevancy and could even prevent 
housing discrimination stemming from the mass 
incarceration of minorities. 
Michael Allen, Jamie Crook, and John Relman—
all long-time fair housing attorneys—argue in 
their paper Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact 
Rule: A Practitioner’s Perspective that, even in 
the most atrocious cases, evidence of intentional 
discrimination is difficult to obtain and, 
consequently, the disparate-impact test serves 
an important role in fighting discriminatory 
housing practices.23  For instance, in the case 
Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center 
v. Saint Bernard Parish,24  a suburb of New Orleans 
took repeated steps to limit the availability of 
rental and multifamily units that black families 
disproportionately occupied. In the first case, 
the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action 
Center (GNOFHAC) fought an ordinance that 
limited the rental of single-family homes to only 
blood relatives.25  After the GNOFHAC won that 
case, Saint Bernard Parish reacted by enacting 
an ordinance that banned multifamily housing.26  
The ordinance clearly had a disproportionate 
impact on black families, but the GNHOFHAC 
had not yet uncovered smoking-gun evidence of 
discriminatory intent. A disparate-impact analysis 
permitted the practitioners to make a strong case 
against the ordinance without any evidence of 
intent and eventually the court overturned both 
ordinances. The Parish remains under a consent 
decree issued by the court, which monitors its 
zoning and planning efforts.27
Allen, Crook, and Relman also argue that 
disparate-impact analysis complements an 
inquiry into disparate treatment. Specifically, 
in the case Baltimore v. Wells Fargo,28  their law 
firm used statistical analysis of racial disparities 
in foreclosure rates jointly with evidence of 
Fair housing advocates are 
concerned about the invalidation 
of the disparate-impact test 
because the leftover source of 
legal liability under the FHA—
intentional discrimination—is 
difficult to prove.
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intentional discrimination to win a multi-million-
dollar settlement for the city, which required the 
issuance of at least $425 million in prime loans 
in the Baltimore area. The first complaint alleged 
reverse-redlining based on a statistical analysis, 
showing that Wells Fargo had disproportionately 
issued subprime loans in minority neighborhoods, 
and charged a higher cost to minority borrowers. 
Only later did evidence of intent surface.29 
Thus, disparate-impact served ‘“as a means 
of smoking out subtle or underlying forms of 
intentional discrimination on the basis of group 
membership.’”30
Fair housing advocates also argue that the 
Supreme Court has agreed to hear fair housing 
cases that do not represent most disparate-impact 
cases.31  The cases that have reached the Supreme 
Court all involve local policies intended to improve 
housing quality and housing supply in low-
income areas. Scholars characterize such cases as 
housing improvement cases—cases that generally 
seek to avoid the disproportionate displacement 
of minorities from existing opportunities. For 
instance, the 2012 case Magner v. Gallagher 
involved claims against policies or regulations 
that displaced minorities at disproportionate rates 
while aiming to improve the quality of the housing 
stock in a blighted area; Inclusive Communities 
involves the construction of affordable housing 
in majority-minority neighborhoods under the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit program.32  In 
contrast, most disparate-impact cases involve 
barriers to integration, such as a ban on multi-
family housing or reverse redlining by mortgage 
brokers.33  Scholars emphasize the importance of 
drawing such distinctions because housing barrier 
challenges always further the nondiscrimination 
and integration purposes of the FHA, while 
housing improvement challenges can sometimes 
have the unintended effect of perpetuating 
segregated and substandard housing—a result 
contrary to the purpose of the FHA.34  Housing 
barrier cases also represent most of the FHA 
disparate-impact claims heard on appeal and the 
majority of cases fair housing advocates have 
won.35  Legal scholars argue that the Court has 
cherry-picked cases that are not representative of 
disparate impact litigation as a whole.36 
A R G U I N G  T H E  C A S E  A G A I N S T  D I S P A R A T E - 
I M P A C T
In contrast to fair housing advocates, business 
interests, some state housing agencies, and 
conservative legal scholars argue strongly against 
continued usage of the disparate impact test, 
even as they equally assert the importance of 
rooting out housing discrimination and unfair 
practices. The property insurance and mortgage 
industries have argued that the disparate impact 
rule as currently enforced by HUD “would require 
a disastrous departure from long-established 
risk-based underwriting practices.”37  Conservative 
legal scholars fear that the disparate-impact test 
will result in unfair implicit racial preferences.38  
State agencies argue that disparate impact cases 
have proceeded without showing that a particular 
policy or procedure is the cause of the disparate 
impacts observed. They also argue that these 
cases prevent or slow down redevelopment efforts 
that would help low-income communities.39  In 
essence, both groups argue that HUD should 
limit the act to remedying unfair processes, but 
that, currently, it remedies unequal outcomes of 
otherwise fair and non-discriminatory processes.40 
The property insurance industry takes particular 
issue with disparate impact and has been at the 
center of a number of lawsuits involving HUD’s 
new rule.41  Although no case involving disparate 
impact and property insurance has been fully 
litigated, insurers fear that the new HUD rule could 
result in a fundamental readjustment to risk-as-
sessment and, paradoxically, in a rate structure 
that is unfairly discriminatory.42  Specifically, 
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insurers fear that courts might invalidate lo-
cation-based risk analysis in a poorly targeted 
attempt at equalizing insurance rates across 
communities. The fear seems grounded in the 
uncertainty of litigation. As scholars have even 
noted, the FHA disparate-impact test does permit 
businesses to identify a legitimate business pur-
pose furthered by the discriminatory policies as 
long as no less-discriminatory alternatives exist. 
The Houston Housing Authority filed an amicus 
brief with the Supreme Court in the Inclusive 
Communities case, arguing essentially that the 
Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs has denied approval to three-quarters of 
the housing authority’s development projects in 
the last two years due to fear of disparate-impact 
litigation.43  More specifically, the Houston Housing 
Authority relies on the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) program—a highly-competitive 
affordable housing development subsidy run 
by individual states—to fund its development 
projects.  The new Texas underwriting standards 
imposed after the Fifth Circuit ruling in Inclusive 
Communities made it highly unlikely that it would 
receive funding because most of its projects are in 
minority communities. They argue further that the 
disparate-impact test as applied under Inclusive 
Communities does not take sufficient account of 
local conditions. As Houston is over two-thirds 
minority, nearly any LIHTC project will have a 
disproportionate effect on minorities. The Hous-
ton Housing Authority claims it must therefore 
develop small scale-projects in “high opportunity 
areas” where land prices are higher. As a result of 
the new preference for high opportunity areas, the 
housing authority argues that it cannot develop a 
sufficient supply of affordable, quality housing, as 
blighted areas deteriorate even further.44  
P a r t  I I :  T h e  R o o t s  o f  t h e  L e g a l 
D i s p u t e
Eleven circuit courts have found that the Fair 
Housing Act prohibits practices or procedures that 
have a discriminatory effect (disparate impact), 
absent any evidence of intent.45  The circuit court 
justices who upheld the rule stated (and restated) 
that “[a]s overtly bigoted behavior has become 
more unfashionable, evidence of intent has 
become harder to find. But this does not mean that 
racial discrimination has disappeared.”46  This is a 
good policy argument for continued enforcement 
of the disparate-impact test, but is it a good legal 
argument for sustaining the disparate-impact test? 
Several members of the Supreme Court seem to 
think not. This section will provide an overview of 
the legal arguments for and against the disparate-
impact test, specifically addressing the meaning 
of Smith v. City of Jackson, a case reigniting this 
debate,47 as well as competing interpretations 
of the statutory text and the appropriate weight 
due to HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing 
Act. Ultimately, I argue that the text of the 
FHA speaking to legal remedies is sufficiently 
ambiguous that HUD’s interpretation should be 
given deference.
State agencies argue that 
disparate impact cases have 
proceeded without showing that 
a particular policy or procedure 
is the cause of the disparate 
impacts observed. They also 
argue that these cases prevent or 
slow down redevelopment efforts 
that would help low-income 
communities.
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In particular, the majority opinion in American 
Insurance Association relied heavily on Smith in 
its invalidation of the disparate-impact test. 
In 2013, the American Insurance Association and 
other financial industry plaintiffs filed suit against 
HUD to invalidate HUD’s new regulation clarifying 
the rules of the disparate-impact test. The court 
began its analysis by reviewing whether HUD 
deserved deference as an agency interpreting 
an ambiguous statute. Judge Leon, author of the 
majority opinion, determined that the statute was 
unambiguous and, therefore, HUD’s interpretation 
did not deserve deference.52  From then on, the 
court limited itself to a statutory analysis of 
whether the Fair Housing Act permits disparate-
impact claims. A statutory analysis involves a 
review of the text of the statute in addition to 
the legislative history (statements by relevant 
Congressmen, committee reports, a statement 
by the President), and finally a comparison of the 
statute to similar statutes. Judge Leon began the 
statutory analysis by insisting that the Supreme 
Court demands clear language in a statute 
expressing intent to permit disparate-impact 
litigation before it will approve such a test. Judge 
Leon turned to the text of section 3604(a-b) of the 
Fair Housing Act and concluded that it did not 
contain such clear language. The section states:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a 
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale 
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, 
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 
in connection therewith, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
Instead, Judge Leon concluded that the language 
was only intended to prohibit intentional 
discrimination due to his interpretation of the 
verbs “to refuse,” “make unavailable,” “deny,” and 
S M I T H  V.  C I T Y  O F  J A C K S O N  A N D  I T S 
D I S C O N T E N T S
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided the case 
of Smith v. City of Jackson, which involved a 
disparate-impact claim brought by a cohort of 
older police officers against the City of Jackson, 
Mississippi under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA), one part of the 
employment protections offered by Title VII of 
Civil Rights Act.48  The officers claimed the city 
gave younger officers disproportionately larger 
salary increases, which amounted to an unfair 
disparate impact on older officers.49  The lower 
court ruled in favor of the city and the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, ruling that ADEA did not offer 
disparate-impact relief. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the lower court, but on 
different grounds: the Court argued that ADEA 
did entitle claimants to bring disparate-impact 
claims, but that the police officers did not meet 
the narrow requirements of a disparate-impact 
claim under ADEA.50  The ruling depended in part 
on a textual analysis of the similarity between 
the ADEA statutory text and the disparate-impact 
language contained in Title VII employment cases. 
This ruling re-ignited a debate over disparate 
impact in the fair housing context. Defendants 
and interested parties, like the property insurance 
industry, have since sought to draw distinctions 
between the language contained in the FHA and 
the language enabling disparate-impact claims in 
the ADEA. They argue that unlike the ADEA, the 
FHA does not permit disparate-impact claims.
Since Smith, one circuit court has overruled 
the disparate-impact analysis. This occurred 
in November 2014, after the Supreme Court had 
already agreed to hear Inclusive Communities. 
That case, American Insurance Association v. 
HUD,51  may give insights into how the Supreme 
Court will adjudicate Inclusive Communities. 
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most importantly “to discriminate.”53  He argued 
that these words speak only to an action, but not 
its effect, and that when Congress intends to 
outlaw discriminatory effects, it uses language like 
“would deprive or tend to deprive” and “otherwise 
adversely affect.”54  He further concludes that the 
text of the FHA supposedly supporting disparate-
impact analysis in fact parallels text in ADEA and 
Title VII that supports only disparate-treatment 
claims.55  His arguments are persuasive.
However, a strong counterargument remains. The 
plaintiffs in Magner v. Gallagher56  begin their 
response to arguments like Judge Leon’s by noting 
that the Supreme Court “long ago explained that 
the FHA must be given a ‘generous construction’ in 
light of its ‘broad and inclusive’ language.”57  Then, 
the plaintiffs argued that disparate-impact test 
opponents have too narrowly interpreted Smith. 
Specifically, they noted that the Supreme Court did 
not rely wholly on a textual reading of the statute 
in ADEA. It was just one of many reasons that the 
Court upheld a disparate-impact test in that case; 
however, they noted that the text still supported 
use of the disparate-impact test. They argue that 
the disparate treatment sections of the ADEA and 
Title VII focus on treatment with regard to “the 
targeted individual,” while the FHA makes no such 
reference.58  Furthermore, they argued, the FHA 
uses the language “otherwise make unavailable 
or deny” which parallels the disparate-impact 
language in ADEA, “otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee.”59  And most importantly, 
they argue that “the Judge Leons” of the legal 
world have given too much importance to the 
words “adversely affect.” They argue that the words 
are intended to encapsulate the diverse array of 
property interests affected in the employment 
context by discrimination: “reduced wages or 
benefits, deprivation of training opportunities or 
seniority, or assignment to less attractive or more 
dangerous tasks.”60  The parallel catch-all phrase of 
the FHA is “otherwise make unavailable or deny.” 
This is an equally strong textual analysis; in fact, 
it seems that neither side has established a clear 
textual analysis.
T H E  D E F E R E N C E  D U E  t o  H U D ’ S  A N A LY S I S
Decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence have 
established that the Supreme Court assigns 
great deference to administrative agencies’ 
interpretation of their enabling statutes. The 
theory goes as follows: as a matter of the 
separation of powers, it is the executive branch’s 
role to administer the law, including all executive 
agencies like HUD. If the people do not like the 
way that the executive is administering the law, 
they may seek new legislation through Congress 
or elect a new president. However, the judiciary 
has generally stayed away from such cases except 
in extreme circumstances when an agency has 
abdicated its duties or exceeded the bounds of the 
statute. A two-part test has emerged as part of the 
jurisprudence supporting this theory. If the two 
parts are satisfied in favor of an agency, it receives 
deference. Since HUD passes the two-part test, the 
Supreme Court should defer to its interpretation of 
the Fair Housing Act.
Step one of the analysis is to ask whether 
the statute is ambiguous on the legal issue. 
As previously examined, the answer is yes. 
The statute neither clearly permits disparate-
impact claims nor expressly prohibits them. 
The first step is satisfied. The second step asks 
whether the agency has abused its discretion 
in interpreting the statute, or, in other words, if 
its interpretation is reasonable. Given the clear 
legislative intent expressed in the FHA, I argue 
that HUD has not abused its discretion. But others 
disagree, including the D.C. Circuit and much of 
the financial sector supporting the State of Texas 
in Inclusive Communities.61  This will be a major 
issue for the Supreme Court, whatever its decision 
may be. 
28
K a b at    T r i m m i n g  B a c k  t h e  F a i r  H o u s i n g  A c t
R e f e r e n c e s
1. See “Time Runs Out for St. Bernard Parish,” New York Times, A26 
(March 30, 2011).
2. Id.
3. 517 F.2d 409 (1975).
4. See Twp. of Mount Holly, N.J. v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in 
Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013); Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011).
5. 747 F.3d 275 (2014).
6. See e.g., Jamelle Bouie, The Next Assault on Civil Rights, SLATE 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
politics/2014/10/the_supreme_court_s_next_attack_on_civil_
rights_the_justices_will_likely.html; Sam Hananel, Supreme Court 
to Hear Another Case on Housing Bias, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 
2, 2014), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/02/
supreme-court-housing-bias_n_5920484.html; Nicole Flatow, 
The Supreme Court Is Poised To Cripple The Federal Ban On 
Housing Discrimination, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2014), http://
thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/10/02/3575079/the-supreme-court-
will-hear-a-case-that-could-obliterate-fair-housing-law/.
7. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, Housing Policy in the United States 358-61 
(3d ed. 2015). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2014).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
11. SCHWARTZ, supra n.7 at 331. 
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 281 (2014).
15. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
16. Inclusive Communities, 747 F.3d at 281, quoting 24 C.F.R. § 
100.500.
17. See e.g., Am. Insurance Assoc. v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Develop., __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5802283 at *2 (Nov. 7, 
2014); SCHWARTZ, supra n.7 at 373, n.1.
18. Am. Insurance Assoc., 2014 WL 5802283 at *2.
19. Michael G. Allen, Jamie L. Crook, & John P. Relman, “Assessing 
HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule: A Practitioner’s Perspective,” 49 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 157 (2014). 
20. See, e.g., Bouie, supra n. 6; Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate 
Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years 
of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. 
REV. 357-435 (2013).
21.  Proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause also requires 
evidence of intentional discrimination.
22. See Stacy Seicshnaydre, “Will Disparate Impact Survive,” 
CONSTITUTION DAILY (Nov. 21, 2013). 
23. Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule, supra n.
24. 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La 2009).
25. Allen, Crook, & Relman, supra n. 19, at 165.
26. Id.
27. Id. 
C o n c l u s i o n
Because of ideological differences in how the 
government should balance business interests 
and the interests of minorities, the question of 
whether the Supreme Court will invalidate the 
disparate-impact test is not easy to answer. It is 
clear that four justices will support it and four will 
oppose it; this will not be a unanimous opinion. 
Reports from oral argument suggest that the vote 
hangs on Justice Scalia—a surprise swing vote 
given his general antipathy to civil rights laws 
that might require a race-based policy decision 
from government.62  No one could guess which 
way he might vote. But regardless of the outcome, 
the US remains a deeply segregated society—with 
or without the disparate-impact test. The Fair 
Housing Act already has failed to address decades 
of racist housing policies and practices among 
all levels of government, and across competing 
business sectors. It is hard to imagine achieving 
integration with an even weaker version of the 
Fair Housing Act.63 
29
AGORA 9 
28. For details on the case, see Id. at 161-64. 
29. Id. at 163 (describing employee testimony describing 
discriminatory practices at the bank, including describing suprime 
loans as “ghetto loans” and describing subprime loans as “too good 
for white people.”)
30. Id. at 163 quoting Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 652 (2001).
31. See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra n. 20 at 362..
32. See, e.g., Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
33. Seicshnaydre, supra n.20 at 361. 
34. Id. at 361.
35. Id. at 358.
36. Seicshnaydre in CONSTITUTION DAILY, supra n.22.
37. Am. Insurance Assoc. v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Develop., __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5802283 at *3, n.6 (Nov. 7, 
2014). See also Michael J. Miller, “Disparate Impact and Unfairly 
Discriminatory Insurance Rates,” Casualty Actuarial Society 
E-Forum 276 (Winter 2009).
38. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 
UCLA L. Rev. 701, 703 n.8 (2006) (discussing criticism that disparate 
impact leads to quotas).
39. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of Houston Hous. Auth. in support of 
the petitioners in Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Dep’t of 
Hous. & Comm. Affairs on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
See also Inclusive Communities Project, 747 F.3d 275, 283 (2014) (J. 
Jones concurring).
40. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Am. Fin. Serv. Assoc., the 
Consumer Mortg. Coalition, the Ind. Comm. Bankers of Am., and the 
Mortg. Bankers Assoc. in support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment in the case of Prop. Casualty Ins. of Am. v. Donovan, No. 
13-cv-08564 (June 30, 2014). 
41. See, e.g., Am. Insurance Assoc. v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Develop., __ F. supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5802283 (Nov. 7, 2014); 
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America v. Donovan, 
__ F.Supp.2d __ ,  2014 WL 4377570 (2014) (concerning the poor 
response by HUD to issues raised by insurance company during 
comment rulemaking period).
42. Miller, supra n. 37 at 287.
43. Amici Curiae Brief of Hous. Hous. Auth. in support of the 
petitioners in the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, no. 
13-1371 (2014).
44. Id. at 11.
45. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 
2000); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of HUD, 56 F.3d 
1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 1995); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482-83 (9th Cir. 
1988); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 
926, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Hanson v. 
Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. City of 
Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Marengo 
Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Town 
of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Resident Advisory 
Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 
(1978); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington 
Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 
(8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
46. Metro. Hous. Develop. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977).
47. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id.
  
51. __ F. supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 5802283 (Nov. 7, 2014).
52. Id. at *7.
53. Id. at *7-9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. No. 10-1032, 2011 WL 2441685 (S. Ct. 2011).
57. Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Magner 
v. Gallagher, No. 10-1032 (U.S. June 15, 2011) quoting Trafficante v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972).
58. Id. at *14.
59. Id. 
60. Id.
61. See American Insurance Assoc. v. HUD, __ F. supp. 3d ___, 2014 
WL 5802283 (Nov. 7, 2014).
62. Lyle Denniston, Argument analysis: Scalia versus Scalia on 
housing law?, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 21, 2015, 1:40 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2015/01/argument-analysis-scalia-versus-scalia-
on-housing-law/
63. Advocates are advised to pursue HUD enforcement of the 
affirmatively furthering fair housing contract clause attached 
to every Community Development Block Grant, and also to seek 
heavy enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act against 
unfair lenders. Advocates may also seek change at the state level, 
demanding that state legislators enforce “fair share requirements” 
on all municipalities. 
